← All updates

Cooperation Theory in International Relations


In theory, knowing the elements of cooperation theory ought to be applicable to real-world dilemmas -- conflict and cooperation between nations, ending civil wars, for example. Here are two summaries: a broad view of the mechanics of international conflict and cooperation through the lens of game theory; and an application of game theory to very real-world situations such as the civil war in El Salvador ("Wood identifies a way to craft a peace settlement so that it is  optimally robust, by examining where the belief thresholds for all  parties intersect along potential distributions.")


Source:  After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Chapter Four)
Pub:  Princeton University Press:  1984
URL:  https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691122489/after-hegemony

Author: Keohane, Robert

Findings:

  • A  'harmony of interests' exists when two parties can both get where they  want by pursuing their own goals without communicating. Their pursuit of  their own interests automatically achieves the Other's interests  as well.  Where harmony exists, cooperation is unnecessary.   Coordination can happen, but it isn't cooperation, it’s just  communicating and coordinating already harmonious endeavors.

  • Cooperation isn't necessary unless there is a conflict in the  pursuit of interests.  Cooperation requires behavioral adjustment to  other’s interests.

  • Discord is possible in two ways:  1) refusal to adjust, or 2)  failure to adjust.  In contrast to outright refusal to adjust, failure  to adjust means an attempt was made but the process of cooperation  failed to overcome collective action problems.

  • Getting to cooperation may involve redefining what is in a given actor's "self-interest."

One Sentence:

Using “international  [cooperation] regimes” as an example, Keohane examines how cooperation  is possible in the absence of a “hegemon” to enforce compliance.

One Paragraph:

Using  “international [cooperation] regimes” as an example, Keohane examines  how cooperation is possible in the absence of a “hegemon” to enforce  compliance.  Cooperation regimes set expectations and reinforce norms,  they shape actors’ behavior in the long-term, and thus promote sustained  cooperation.

One Page:

Using  “international [cooperation] regimes” as an example, Keohane examines  how cooperation is possible in the absence of a “hegemon” to enforce  compliance.

Keohane distinguishes cooperation from harmony and discord as follows:

  • Harmony refers to a situation in which actors’ policies (pursued in  their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically  facilitate attainment of the other’s goals.  An example is the classical  economic market, in which Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” regulates  supply and demand.

  • Cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or  organizations – which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into  conformity with one another through mutual adjustment.

  • Discord, the opposite of harmony, stimulates the need for cooperation

Cooperation takes places only in situations where actors perceive  that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict, not where  there is harmony. Without the specter of conflict, there is no need to  cooperate.

Any act of cooperation or apparent cooperation needs to be  interpreted within the context of related actions, and of prevailing  expectations and shared beliefs, before its meaning can be properly  understood.

Quoting John Ruggie, Keohane defines regimes as a “set of mutual  expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and  financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.”  Both formal rules and informal norms (standards of behavior) are used to  sustain international cooperation. A major function of regimes is to  facilitate the making of specific cooperative agreements among states.

Because regimes set expectations and reinforce norms, they shape  actors’ behavior in the long-term, and thus promote sustained  cooperation.


Title:  Modeling Robust Settlements to Civil War: Indivisible Stakes and Distributional Compromises
Pub:  Santa Fe Institute: Working Papers, October 2003
URL:  http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/wpabstract/200310056

Author: Wood, Elisabeth Jean

Findings:

  • Sanctioning trade of illicit commodities is recommended to reverse its negative effects on brokering a settlement.


  • Outcome uncertainty, as is common in the tumult of a civil war,  results in less robust settlements, but can be counteracted with  diplomatic efforts to increase confidence in the mutual-compliance  settlement.  Positive personal interactions between top leaders of  conflicting parties and confidence inspired by mediators will facilitate  finding the optimal distributional terms.  Power sharing arrangements,  such as decentralization of power into sub-national units and guaranteed  numbers of positions for minority groups, can lessen the impact of  uncertainty resulting from post-war elections.


  • Parties can limit the variation of post-war outcomes by arranging  market institutions  to counteract variation that might come about in  post-war policy-making.  For instance, a conflict between one side that  represents the interests of labor and one of capital could be buffered  with a constitutional focus on the rights to private property and to  strike.  In South Africa and El Salvador, promotion of economic  interdependence between parties was encouraged by elites to safeguard  their freedom of choice for investment.


  • Although the hope is that a self-enforcing cooperative strategy of  withdrawal is sustainable  without external enforcement, third party  actors can assist by forming and monitoring institutions that promote  revenue sharing.  The implementation of such a plan is often difficult  and can be complicated by the limiting factors of war-time benefits.  As  of the writing of the article the role of international actors in  monitoring the distribution of revenue was being discussed in Sudanese  peace negotiations.

One Sentence:

From  mathematical modeling of the risk factors and uncertainty involved in a  party’s continued conflict, withdrawal from conflict or commitment to a  peace agreement, the distributional aspects surrounding civil war  negotiations are shown to determine the robustness and range of  potential settlements; the actual moves of conflicting parties in civil  wars are found to reflect the dynamics of game theoretical models.

One Paragraph:

In  the absence of a decisive military advantage, self-enforcing peace  settlements are still possible in a civil war.  Wood explores the  conditions under which parties will not necessarily renege in the  absence of external enforcement, regarding settlements which distribute  post-war political power and economic resources.  Self-enforcing  settlements rely on each party surpassing a “critical belief threshold”  wherein the best response becomes to compromise for peace given the  other party’s likelihood to compromise.  In other words, the critical  belief threshold is surpassed by altering the structure of payoffs so as  to change the conflict from a Prisoner’s Dilemma to an Assurance Game.   

Continuing to fight can be a self-enforcing strategy, as is seen in  real conflicts when war-time benefits like illicit trade are not  reproducible in times of peace.  The range of potential settlements is  the set of distributional arrangements in which the critical belief  threshold is surpassed for both parties.  The robustness of a settlement  refers to its ability to withstand the exogenous shocks that often  occur and influence the confidence of parties in the peace process.   

Wood identifies a way to craft a peace settlement so that it is  optimally robust, by examining where the belief thresholds for all  parties intersect along potential distributions.  She introduces as a  variable in the conflict the perceived degree of indivisibility of  stakes, as stakes in real conflicts are often not totally divisible or  indivisible and the actor’s perceptions play a large role.  Perceptions  of indivisibility of goods reduce the range and robustness of potential  settlements.  Examples of partially indivisible stakes include holy  sites, strategic locations and network systems, wherein control is not  worth very much until the party controls a lot of it.  Factions often  arise within a party when there are differing opinions on the payoff of a  settlement and similarly lead in the theoretical model to decreases in  the range and robustness of settlements.